We study optimal punishment in an all-pay contest with endogenous entry, where the participant with the lowest performance may be punished. When a small punishment is introduced, the lowest ability players drop out and those of medium ability exert less e¤ort, while only the highest ability players exert more e¤ort. A su¢ cient condition is given for the optimal punishment to be zero if the objective is to maximize the expected total e¤ort. As cost functions become more convex, punishment becomes less desirable. When the objective is to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort, a positive punishment is desirable under much weaker conditions. (JEL C72, D72, D82)
Introduction
In daily life, "carrots and sticks" refers to a policy of o¤ering a combination of rewards and punishments to induce some desired behavior. In the literature on contests, focus has been on the carrots (allocating prizes to the top players), with little attention paid to the sticks (punishing the bottom players). A possible reason why punishments have received little theoretical attention is that if players have to participate in a contest then it is trivial that introducing a punishment will be e¤ective in increasing e¤ort. That is, for a given group of players who have to participate, punishing the player who exerts the lowest e¤ort level will increase the total e¤ort for sure. In fact, punishments should be made as large as possible in order to maximize e¤ort. However, adding a punishment, especially when the punishment is large, may violate individual rationality constraints, i.e., a player can …nd that his expected utility in equilibrium is below his outside option.
In this paper we assume that potential players observe the reward/punishment scheme before deciding whether or not to participate in a contest. We call this type of contest an open contest and consider whether punishments are desirable in this context. For example, a profession in which low performers lose their jobs-which can be regarded as a punishment-may discourage entry; is it the case that this in turn may lead to less competition among those who do enter, and so negate the positive e¤ect on e¤ort of a punishment mentioned above? Should essay contests announce only the winners, or should they announce the entire ranking, subjecting the worst performers to potential humiliation? Should promotion contests where employees can choose whether or not to participate only announce the winner, or would it lead to a better top candidate if the bottom candidates were penalized in some way?
To make progress on this sort of question, we analyze whether punishments are a useful incentive mechanism for increasing e¤ort in an open, perfectly discriminating contest (where e¤orts exerted are perfectly observable to the contest designer), where players di¤er by ability (cost of e¤ort), which is private information. We assume that there is a …xed prize for the highest e¤ort, but that the contest designer can choose to impose a punishment on the lowest performer. The punishment neither consumes resources nor yields resources to the designer. We build on the seminal model of Moldovanu and Sela (2001) which explains prize structures in contests within the framework of private value all-pay auctions.
Our results can be summarized as follows. If the contest designer wants to maximize the total e¤ort from all potential players, the optimal punishment will be zero for a wide class of cases (a positive optimal punishment can only occur when high ability players are relatively probable). As cost functions become more convex, starting from linear costs, the optimal punishment decreases, i.e., punishment becomes less desirable. If the contest designer seeks only to maximize the e¤ort of the top player, a strictly positive punishment should be set under weaker conditions, and certainly if there are a su¢ cient number of players.
Our work is closely related to Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010) , who also look at punishments in perfectly discriminating contests. In one section of their paper, a model in which players can choose whether or not to participate is also analyzed. 1 1 Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010) also consider a range of other scenarios, starting with situations where punishments can only be administered at a cost (subject to a …xed budget), and where players have to participate. If only punishments can be administered, they establish under a likelihood ratio condition that using all resources on a single punishment on the worst performer is optimal. If both rewards and punishments are feasible, then resources may be expended on a single Their result appears to contradict the corresponding result in our paper: In order to maximize expected total e¤ort, they …nd that a strictly positive punishment is always optimal while we …nd the optimal punishment is zero in a wide range of cases. 2 The reason for this di¤erence lies in the assumption about the support of the distribution of the marginal cost of e¤ort. Our paper follows the assumptions of Moldovanu and Sela (2001) in assuming that this distribution has positive and bounded support. By contrast, in Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010) the inverse of the marginal cost (denoted by a) is assumed to be distributed on the interval [0; 1], so the marginal cost (i.e., 1=a) is distributed on the interval [1; +1). Our results show that with a bounded support [s; s] (where s > s > 0), the desirability of a punishment depends critically on the shape of the cost parameter distribution. 3 In this respect, our results can be seen as complementary to theirs, and we would argue that in practice a bounded support is often realistic. For example, in contests involving professionals, the support of the ability distribution is typically bounded due to prior constraints on entry to the profession. Thus, in these situations, punishment is likely to be undesirable. This seems to be more consistent with what we observe in reality: explicit punishment is rarely used in open contests.
Intuitively, introducing a punishment has two e¤ects. Firstly, a selection e¤ect: some players will drop out, and these will be those towards the bottom of the ability range who are likely to lose anyway. This leads to the competition between the actual participants becoming less …erce since fewer players are involved. Those prize/punishment depending on the distribution of abilities. Alternatively, if the size of punishment is …xed, and punishments are costless, they characterize the optimal number of punishments. 2 who participate but are near the nonparticipation threshold will put in less e¤ort, since they anticipate being beaten by higher ability players (at the threshold, e¤ort must be zero). Secondly, there is an incentive e¤ect due to the desire to avoid the punishment. The two e¤ects occur at the same time. We show that when a su¢ ciently small punishment is introduced, the low ability players drop out and the medium ability players exert less e¤ort, while only the high ability players exert more e¤ort. This explains our contrasting results. When a punishment is introduced, expected total e¤ort is likely to fall because of the loss of the lowest ability players and the fact that the medium ability ones exert less e¤ort. On the other hand because the highest ability players exert more e¤ort, the expected highest individual e¤ort will increase for a wider range of ability distributions.
An entry fee (or minimum-e¤ort requirement) is in some respects similar to a punishment in that it also excludes low-ability players from a contest. Higgins, Shughart and Tollison (1985) study a contest where there is a …xed entry cost for everyone and contestants enter randomly in equilibrium. In an all-pay auction model, Kaplan and Sela (2010) provide a rationale for entry fees in contests by analyzing a two-stage model 4 with privately known entry costs. investigate an imperfectly discriminating contest where the potential contestants bear …xed entry costs and the contest designer has a …xed budget with two strategic instruments: the prize purse and monetary transfers (subsidy/fee). Fu, Jiao and Lu (2011) study imperfectly discriminating contests with endogenous and stochastic entries. 5 They show that the designer may bene…t from noisier contests and prefers to invite only a subset of potential contestants to participate. Finally there has 4 In the …rst stage, potential players make entry decisions given entry costs being privately known; in the second stage, participants make e¤orts (bids) after …nding out who else has entered. 5 is a positive outside option which is lost upon entry, so this is similar to an entry fee) and Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2010) .
The di¤erence between an entry fee and a punishment should be emphasized.
First, with an entry fee, all participants have to su¤er some cost to enter the contest, while in our model only the participant with the lowest e¤ort will be punished by su¤ering a loss. Secondly, it has been proved that with linear cost functions, a contest with a single …rst prize and an (optimally set) entry fee is total e¤ort maximizing among all feasible mechanisms that are incentive compatible and individual rational (Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981) , while in this paper, with no entry fee, we show that for the same objective function, a punishment on the worst performer is often not desirable.
In a seminal paper of a large literature on contests (or tournaments), Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that rank-order contests help to solve a moral hazard problem. In that adding a punishment enables the contest designer to control contestants'incentives to exert e¤ort and to alter output variance according to the designer's aims. 6 Akerlof and Holden (2010) extend Lazear and Rosen's (1981) analysis to the case 6 For example, as here, Gilpatric (2009) analyzes two possible aims of the contest organizer:
maximizing total e¤ort when she values all contestants'e¤ort equally, or maximizing highest individual e¤ort when she only values the highest of the contestants'e¤orts.
with multiple prizes and show that it is often optimal to give rewards that di¤er between top performers by a smaller magnitude than the corresponding punishments to poor performers. We stress that the context of the above papers is very di¤erent from the one which we deal with: they focus on the symmetric case where all players are homogeneous but e¤ort and performance is stochastically related, whereas we look at a perfectly discriminating contest with endogenous entry where heterogeneous contestants have private information on their abilities. In a setting of perfectly discriminating contests (as in Moldovanu and Sela, 2001 , and this paper), Minor (2012) shows that with strictly convex costs, having an inverted reward structure-in which a larger prize goes to second place than to …rst place-may be optimal as the less able are more incentivized. Likewise punishment, considered here, leads to a "steep" reward structure and may create adverse incentives, the more so as convexity of costs increase. In this sense, Minor's results are consistent with ours.
The contest literature has mostly focussed on the case of maximizing expected total e¤ort. However in practice, the contest designer may not value all contestants' e¤orts equally, and may care more about the performance of the top (one or several) contestants. Given this motivation, and as mentioned earlier, we also analyze what the optimal punishment would be when the contest designer seeks to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort. For example, in the research contests studied by Taylor (1995) , the contest designer will only use the best submission from among all contestants. In sporting competitions, the contest designer may be interested only in the performance of the top player(s). Levitt (1995) argues that in many contexts where multiple players are assigned to a task, only one of their outputs will be used:
This is especially true of creative endeavors such as the development of advertising campaigns. Another example is suggested by Gilpatric (2009) : "If one considers a group of junior faculty competing to win tenure, the department may value the output of all contestants, but the output of the winners may be valued more than that of the losers because the winners will be retained and their output will provide greater ongoing reputation bene…ts to the department."
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, after setting up the model formally with a linear cost function, we derive a symmetric equilibrium where the e¤ort levels of participants in the contest are characterized by an equilibrium e¤ort function. By analyzing this equilibrium e¤ort function, we elaborate on what happens when a small or large punishment is introduced. In sections 3 and 4, we discuss what the optimal punishment should be when maximizing the expected total e¤ort and the expected highest individual e¤ort respectively. In addition, the relationship of our work to that of Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010) is analyzed in section 3.1. In section 5, we extend our previous analysis (with linear cost functions)
to the convex cost case. Concluding remarks are provided in section 6.
The Model
There are k 3 potential players in a perfectly discriminating contest with a …xed 7 prize V > 0. Assuming there is at least one participant, the player with the highest e¤ort will win the prize, and the player with the lowest e¤ort will be punished by bearing a loss P , 0 P V , which is a choice variable of the contest designer. If only one player participates in the contest, he receives the prize and the punishment 7 We assume the prize is simply …xed in value, and it is indivisible. While we do not show that with divisibility it is still optimal to have a single prize, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) show that, with linear and concave cost functions, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single …rst prize in order to maximize the expected total e¤ort. at the same time. 8 Ex ante all potential players choose simultaneously whether or not to enter this contest, and (at the same time) conditional on entry, player i chooses an e¤ort level x i . 9 E¤ort level x i causes player i a disutility of c i x i , where c i denotes player i's knowledge. We assume that F has a continuous density function f = dF=dc > 0.
Each player maximizes expected utility given the values of the prize and the punishment. We assume that if a potential contestant chooses not to enter the contest, he receives an outside option of 0. Thus, for each player, the participation constraint requires his (ex ante) expected utility to be non-negative. The contest designer determines the size of the punishment in order to maximize the expected value of the sum of the e¤orts (i.e., P k i=1 x i ) or the expected value of the highest individual e¤ort. 10 
The Objective Function and Entry Decision
Given the commonly known values of V and P , a participant (who chooses to enter the contest) with ability parameter c, solves the following problem by choosing e¤ort 8 If more than one player exerts the highest (lowest) e¤ort, the prize (punishment) is randomly allocated among them. In the equilibrium we study this happens with zero probability. 9 Take an essay contest for example: students have to submit their essays by the deadline, so they do not know the number of participants until after the deadline. 10 We assume that the contest designer only focuses on e¤ort levels and does not get any material bene…t or cost directly from the prize or the punishment. The value of the punishment thus cannot be used to …nance the prize. level x:
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We look for an equilibrium such that players with c 2 [s; e) participate in the contest and every player exerts e¤ort according to a strictly decreasing di¤erentiable
Players with c 2 [e; s] do not participate in the contest.
A player with c = e is indi¤erent between participating in the contest or not;
we refer to such a player as the marginal player. If he enters he will exert zero e¤ort, b(e) = 0. This follows as the marginal player has the lowest e¤ort of any entrant: in equilibrium he will lose against all other entrants with probability one, so if he was putting in positive e¤ort a deviation to zero e¤ort would be pro…table.
He anticipates being punished with probability one which is exactly o¤set by the chance he is the only entrant, in which case he would win the prize. So the marginal player's expected utility is:
V Pr(e¤ort is the highest) P Pr(e¤ort is the lowest) e 0 = 0, which implies
Players with c e are indi¤erent about entering and setting e = 0; we consider only equilibria in which they do not enter. 11 Equation (1) implies that the larger P is, the smaller F (e) is, and so the smaller e is, i.e., fewer players would enter the contest. In particular, if the contest designer sets the punishment to the same value as the prize, i.e., P = V , then from (1), 1 F (e) = 1 so that F (e) = 0 and e = s.
Consequently no player will enter. 12 Only when P < V do potential entrants exist and exert positive e¤ort.
If a player's ability parameter is c, the probability of another player's ability parameter being smaller than c is F (c). Moreover by the fact that entrants'e¤ort is strictly decreasing in c, a participant who makes an e¤ort x in equilibrium has ability c = b 1 (x). Then, given the equilibrium behavior of other competitors, a player who enters the contest solves the following problem: 13 M ax
is the probability that all other potential players exert less e¤ort than x and [F (b 1 (x)) + (1 F (e))] k 1 is the probability that all other players either exert more e¤ort than x or do not participate in the contest. 14 
The Equilibrium
Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium with prize V and punishment P where 0 P V , players with c 2 [e; s] do not participate in the contest, while players with c 2 [s; e) participate in the contest and exert e¤ort according to the following strictly decreasing equilibrium e¤ort function:
where e satis…es (1):
As V; P > 0 and b 0 (c) < 0, the equilibrium e¤ort function is strictly decreasing in c,
i.e., the more able a participant is, the higher the e¤ort he exerts in equilibrium. 15 
Introducing a Small Punishment
With zero punishment, e = s and F (e) = F (s) = 1, so by (4) we obtain
When a punishment P > 0 is introduced, we can write (4) as
Thus for every c 2 [s; e), b 0 (c)j P >0 < b 0 (c)j P =0 :
We can interpret the slope of b(c) as the degree of relative competition between participants, so this shows that a positive punishment leads to more intense relative competition. This is what we referred to as an incentive e¤ect in the introduction.
However, it does not follow that participants will exert more e¤ort than before.
Marginal participants, that is with abilities close to e, will exert less e¤ort, and 15 From (4), it also follows that a consolation prize (a negative punishment, P < 0) for the bottom player will never be optimal as everyone exerts less e¤ort compared to the case with P = 0 (e = s for P 0, so there is no gain from increased participation). To the extent they exist in the real world, it could be argued that there may be a psychic loss for the bottom participant from being revealed as the loser; therefore, a consolation prize to cancel out this "punishment" would be optimal whenever P = 0 is optimal in the corresponding model with zero psychic costs.
it may even be that all players exert less e¤ort because fewer players participate.
The following proposition summarizes the relative competition e¤ect, and conditions under which some players exert more e¤ort and those under which all players exert less e¤ort.
Proposition 2 (a) The equilibrium e¤ort function b(c) becomes steeper as P in-
The two equilibrium e¤ort functions b(c)j P >0 and b(c)j P =0 either cross once or do not cross at all. For P su¢ ciently small they will cross once, while for P su¢ ciently large they do not cross. When they cross once, say at point
Proof. See Appendix.
In the proof of (b) it is shown that if the contest designer introduces a (suf-…ciently) small punishment into an open contest, players with the highest ability (lowest values of c) will increase their e¤ort. Because it is always the case that some low ability (high c) players drop out when P > 0 and the e¤ort function is steeper when positive, this means the e¤ort functions must cross once. This is illustrated in Figure 1 (where b 1 (c) corresponds to P = 0 and b 2 (c) to some small P > 0). The players with c 2 [s; c ); whom we call the high ability players, will exert more e¤ort;
the players with c 2 (c ; e]; whom we call the medium ability players, will exert less e¤ort; and the players with c 2 [e; s] whom we call the low ability players, will drop out.
However, when the punishment is (su¢ ciently) large, as in Figure 2 (where b 1 (c) corresponds to P = 0, and b 2 (c) now to some large P > 0), all participants will exert less e¤ort than before since too many players drop out, i.e., b(c)
Figure 2 E¤ort functions when a large punishment is introduced
This characterization leaves open the question of whether a positive punishment is desirable. Even though the e¤ort of the most able unambiguously rises with the introduction of a relatively small P , it does not follow that the expected highest e¤ort rises since the most able may not be present in a given population of players.
Moreover if the contest designer is interested in the sum of e¤orts, even if the most able are present, the fact that when P > 0 others reduce their e¤ort or do not participate, implies that a positive punishment is even less likely to be desirable. 16 We now turn to analyze this question in more detail.
Maximizing Expected Total E¤ort
In this section, it is assumed that the contest designer's aim is to maximize the expected total e¤ort. For example a university wants to set an essay contest in some speci…c …eld to improve the overall academic level of all students in that …eld.
It wants all the students to contribute as much as possible, i.e., it wants to maximize the expected total e¤ort.
In equilibrium, the expected average e¤ort (AE) of each potential player is given by
We have shown that there is an equilibrium e¤ort function x = b(c) which is strictly decreasing for participants with c 2 [s; e), and b(c) = 0 for all players with c e.
There are k potential players, so from (3) the expected total e¤ort (T E) is
where
Maximizing T E is equivalent to maximizing R 1 . In the appendix, we prove the following result by analyzing (10):
In an open contest with k 3 players, if the density function f (c)
is non-decreasing in c on the interval [s; s], in order to maximize expected total e¤ort it is optimal to set P = 0.
Proposition 3 states that a non-decreasing density constitutes a su¢ cient condition for optimal punishment being zero. 17 This is not a necessary condition, however, and the optimal punishment can be zero with a decreasing density distributions.
When f (c) is non-decreasing (i.e., increasing or staying constant) with c, the contest designer anticipates relatively few high ability players. Then, adding even a small punishment, which will exert the low ability players drop out and medium players exert less e¤ort, will decrease the expected total e¤ort.
When f (c) is decreasing with c, to maximize expected total e¤ort, the optimal punishment may still be zero (see Example 1) or strictly positive (see Example 2).
A decreasing density function implies that the contest designer expects there to be a relatively large number of high ability players. Since their e¤ort levels respond positively to a small punishment, in order to maximize total e¤ort punishment may be desirable. Note that in Example 2 (RIGHT in Figure 3 ) f 2 (c) is decreasing in c at a faster rate compared to f 1 (c) in Example 1 (LEFT in Figure 3 ), which is consistent with the intuition given above. 18 18 Examples 1 and 2 can be established analytically. In general with k = 3 and support [1; 11] ;
and assuming the density function is linear with a slope a (so that a 2 [ 0:02; 0:02] which ensures that the density function is always strictly positive on the interior of the support [1; 11]), and grid step of 0:001, numerical simulations show that, the optimal punishment P > 0 when 0:020 a 0:006 and P = 0 when 0:005 a 0:020. Examples 1 and 2 are then two special cases of those simulations with a = 0:004 and a = 0:02 respectively.
Relationship to Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010)
Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2010) analyze a similar situation to the above. 19 They prove that to maximize expected total e¤ort the optimal punishment is always strictly positive. This seems to contradict our above result that when f (c) is nondecreasing in c, the optimal punishment is zero, and even when f (c) is decreasing in c, the optimal punishment may still be zero (see Example 1) . As discussed in the introduction, however, translated into our model they assume that the density 
Therefore the optimal punishment is strictly positive.
If the support of F is [1; +1) then this excludes the possibility that the Propo- To get some rough intuition, consider starting with a …nite support for F , and suppose a small punishment e P is introduced. By (1), this …xes F (e) and hence e. As argued above, the e¤ect of introducing e P is that this increases the e¤ort 19 See section 4.2 of their paper. levels of the most able while reducing e¤ort levels of those with costs close to (but below) e. Moreover all players with costs above e drop out. As we have seen, the bene…t of introducing e P may be positive or negative depending on F . Suppose now that we change F by increasing its support (letting s increase) and "stretching"the distribution across this wider support, but leaving F unchanged for c e. Clearly, the equilibrium of the game with punishment e P is unchanged as exactly the same players participate as before (e is unchanged). However the bene…t of introducing e P is di¤erent now: when P = 0 the players with c > e are likely to exert very low levels of e¤ort as they mostly have high values for c. Moreover even the players with c close to e will have very low levels of e¤ort because there is e¤ectively no competition from players with lower ability (see (3)). So when e P is introduced, not only is the cost of players with c > e dropping out very small, but also the drop in e¤ort made by those close to e is also small. E¤ectively what we called the selection e¤ect becomes insigni…cant, and the incentive e¤ect of the punishment on the higher ability players dominates for a su¢ ciently stretched support. The bene…t of introducing e P will thus become positive.
In other words, c being distributed on [1; +1) with f (c) > 0 implies, from the contest designer's point of view, the weakest (possible) players are always a group of extremely low ability players (with c = 1=a ! +1 as a ! 0), so starting from a situation without punishment, introducing a small punishment will make these extremely low ability players drop out and the high ability players exert more e¤ort.
Because those players with extremely low abilities exert little (almost zero) e¤ort in the situation without punishment, the selection e¤ect is dominated by the incentive e¤ect. Therefore, the expected total e¤ort increases after the introduction of an appropriately small punishment.
Maximizing Expected Highest Individual E¤ort
Instead of maximizing expected total e¤ort, in this section, we focus on the case where the contest designer wants to elicit the highest individual e¤ort. As we mentioned in the introduction, in many contexts, such as research contests and contests among creative endeavors, the contest designer may only care about the best submission from among all contestants, i.e., she seeks to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort. Or in our previous example, assume now the university only needs the best essay from its students, with all essays of a lesser quality than the best being of no interest. Even though we have seen that a positive punishment will raise the e¤ort of the highest ability players, this does not mean that the expected highest e¤ort will increase as it may be that all k players have abilities below the critical level above which e¤ort increases (i.e., with c above c as de…ned in Proposition 2). Nevertheless given that it only the highest e¤ort level that matters, we will …nd that there are more circumstances under which a positive punishment is called for compared to the previous case. 20 Rank the players'ability parameters as follows: c 1 < c 2 < ::: < c k , so c 1 is the most able player. First consider G 1 (c), de…ned as the distribution function of c 1 .
The probability that all potential players are less able than type c, is (1 F (c)) k , then the probability that at least one player is more able than c is 1 (1 F (c)) k .
Therefore,
20 For a given P; the punishment is ex post bene…cial if the most able player, type c 1 , is more able than type c , i.e., c 1 < c . This is more likely to occur than the total e¤ort being ex post higher (it follows from Proposition 2 that c 1 < c is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for the total to be higher). This suggest that the ex ante comparison will go the same way.
Hence, the probability density function of c 1 is
Therefore, the expected highest individual e¤ort can be expressed as
Proposition 4
In an open contest with k 3 players, given a distribution function F; there exists a number k such that for any number of players k > k , the optimal punishment is always strictly positive when the contest designer's aim is to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort.
In Proposition 4, a su¢ ciently large k ensures that the optimal punishment is strictly positive. Intuitively, when the number of potential players is su¢ ciently large, the chance of the top player being a high ability player will be close to one, in which case a strictly positive punishment is optimal.
Allowing the density function f (c) to take any form, the proposition gives a relatively strong condition on the number of potential players (k > k ) to guarantee a positive optimal punishment. For speci…c forms of f (c), k need not be large, and may not bind at all. For example: Proof. See Appendix.
The requirement that the most able player is at least 1:47 times as e¢ cient as the least possible able player seems to be fairly mild for practical applications. 21 Thus, when abilities are drawn from a uniform distribution and s=s 1:47, to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort the optimal punishment is strictly positive, while by Proposition 3, to maximize expected total e¤ort the optimal punishment is zero.
Strictly Convex Costs
So far we assumed a linear cost function. In this section, we look at the case with a strictly convex cost function. 22 This is arguably a more realistic assumption. 23 We look at the same model described in Section 2 with the only di¤erence that we assume now that an e¤ort x will cause a player with ability c a disutility of c (x).
Assume (0) = 0, 0 > 0 and 00 > 0, so the cost function c (x) is convex. Let g be the inverse function of , i.e., g := 1 , then it is straightforward to show that g 0 > 0 and g 00 < 0. The following can be obtained by a simple transformation of the equilibrium strategies we found in the linear case. strictly decreasing equilibrium e¤ort function:
where e satis…es (1) and b(c) is the equilibrium e¤ort function in the linear case, which is de…ned by (3).
Given g 0 > 0; equation (12) implies that our previous results (in Proposition 2 (b)) on the ranking of e¤ort functions as P changes still hold. In particular,
Let T E X denote the expected total e¤ort in the convex case (where the superscript X refers to the case with convex cost functions). Thus,
From (13),
By Proposition 2, there are two possible cases regarding the sign of of db(c) dP : either db(c) dP < 0 for all c or there exists a c , s < c < e, such that db(c) dP > 0 for small c (c < c ) and db(c) dP < 0 for large c (e > c > c ). In the former case, dT E X dP de…ned by (14) will be negative as g 0 > 0. In the latter case, g 00 < 0 and b (c) decreasing imply that the negative terms of db(c) dP in the integral de…ning dT E X dP are multiplied by higher values of g 0 than the positive terms. Thus, other parameters held constant, dT E X dP is negative if dT E dP (in the linear case) is negative, and dT E X dP will be negative for some parameters even when dT E dP is positive. Thus Proposition 3 extends to the convex case, as asserted in Propositon 6 (i) below. However, since convexity of the cost function enlarges the set of parameters for which dT E X dP is negative when dT E dP is positive, it will be optimal to set P = 0 in more situations. Indeed, for su¢ ciently convex (e.g., take (x) = x ; > 1; and let ! 1), the weight placed on (the negative value of) db(c) dP in a neighbourhood of c = e, relative to lower values of c, becomes arbitrarily large, and part (ii) of the proposition follows straightforwardly.
Likewise as ( ) becomes more convex, i.e., if a strictly convex transformation is taken of , then again dT E X dP will be negative for a wider constellation of parameters in the more convex case. 24 Finally, by the same logic, starting from a strictly positive optimal punishment, so dT E X dP = 0 at some P > 0, when the cost functions become more convex, ceteris paribus, dT E X dP will become negative and so the optimal punishment will decrease, which justi…es part (iii) of the following proposition. it is optimal to set P = 0 in order to maximize expected total e¤ort; (ii) For a given f ( ), su¢ cient convexity of the cost function implies that it is optimal to set P = 0;
(iii) Starting from a situation where the optimal punishment is strictly positive, when the cost functions become more convex (ceteris paribus), the optimal punishment will decrease.
Roughly speaking, with convex cost functions, it becomes increasingly costly for a player to exert additional e¤ort. Since, in equilibrium, a more able player exerts more e¤ort than a less able player, the more able player is more discouraged by the increasing marginal cost of exerting e¤ort. As P is increased, the extra e¤ort exerted by higher ability players-the only ones who increase e¤ort-is reduced relative to the reduced e¤ort of the lower ability players. Consequently when cost functions become more convex, total e¤ort is more likely to fall when a punishment is either introduced or increased.
Concluding Remarks
We have studied a contest with a …xed prize where potential players can freely choose whether or not to enter. The contest designer can punish the bottom participant and we focused on the optimal punishment for maximizing either the expected total e¤ort or the expected highest individual e¤ort. By introducing a (su¢ ciently) small punishment, some low ability players drop out, medium ability players exert less e¤ort and the highest ability players exert more e¤ort. When the punishment is large enough, low ability players drop out and all participants exert less e¤ort than without punishment. We further show that in order to maximize the expected total e¤ort, punishment is guaranteed to be undesirable when the density function for the e¤ort cost is nondecreasing-the contest designer expects there to be relatively few high ability players; on the other hand, to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort, punishment is considerably more likely to be desirable. In some circumstances there is a trade-o¤ between maximizing the expected total e¤ort and maximizing the expected highest individual e¤ort. In addition, as cost functions become more convex, punishment becomes less desirable. Hence, depending on the objectives of the contest designer, the distribution of abilities and the convexity of costs, punishment may be part of the (optimal) answer.
In our model the prize is exogenously …xed, and we focussed on …nding the optimal amount of punishment. It is however straightforward to see that if the exogenous prize becomes larger (smaller), the corresponding optimal punishment should be increased (decreased) by precisely the same proportion. When both the prize and punishment are endogenously set, and increasing the prize is costly for the contest designer, 25 then the optimal prize (and corresponding punishment) will depend on the cost function of increasing the prize. This is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
We have maintained the assumption that the outside options of potential contestants are zero, so that there is no cost to staying out of the contest. However, it may not unreasonable to suppose that contestants have negative outside options.
For instance, if an economics department increases its failure rate, students may have to su¤er a cost in switching to a di¤erent course. This would allow a positive punishment to be introduced at no cost in terms of participation. Our model can be extended in a straightforward fashion to encompass such cases.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
To maximize (2), the …rst-order condition is:
Rearranging:
Let y denote b 1 (x). As in equilibrium b(c) = x, c = b 1 (x) = y. Then (15) can be written as
The marginal player with ability c = e makes zero e¤ort in equilibrium, this gives the boundary condition y(0) = e. The solution to the di¤erential equation with the boundary condition is given by:
Then we obtain that x = G(y) = G(b 1 (x)), therefore, b G, thus the e¤ort function of every participant (who enters the contest actively) is given by 
Proof of Proposition 2
From (4), we derive Next, we prove that when the punishment is su¢ ciently small, b(c)j P >0 and b(c)j P =0 will cross, or equivalently, that when the punishment is very small, b(s)j P >0 > b(s)j P =0 (as b(c)j P >0 = 0 at c = e < s). From (3):
From (1);
so that de dP = 1 (k 1)f (e)(1 F (e)) k 2 V :
Substituting (18) and (19) into the above equation:
Let P = 0 and c = s; P = 0 implies e = s so that F (e) = F (s) = 1; thus db(s) dP
Thus when a su¢ ciently small punishment is introduced, b(s)j P >0 > b(s)j P =0 will hold and it follows that b(c)j P >0 and b(c)j P =0 cross once.
When P ! V , recall from (1) that e ! s, so b(s)j P >0 ! 0 and consequently for large enough P we have b(s)j P >0 < b(s)j P =0 and b(c)j P >0 and b(c)j P =0 do not cross.
Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that
Di¤erentiating: That is:
Our aim is to prove that when f (x) is non-decreasing in x, dR 1 dP < 0 for 0 P < V , and thus the optimal punishment is zero. Substituting (18) and (19) into ( ), we get ( ) = 1 (k 1)e [2 F (e)]F (e):
In ( ), reversing the order of integration we can write
By assumption f 0 (t) 0. Let g(t) := F (t)=t, h(t) := tf (t) F (t); so that
Hence for all t < e, F (t) =t < F (e)=e. Substituting into (23):
By a similar argument,
Substituting (18), (19) and (25) into ( ), we derive
(equality occurs when P = 0). From (22), (24) and (26), we obtain dR 1 dP = ( ) + ( ) + ( ) < (2 F (e))F (e) (k 1)e + F (e) (k 1)e + F (e)(1 F (e)) (k 1)e = 0:
Therefore, dR 1 =dP < 0 for all P 2 [0; V ).
Proof of Claim in Case 1:
Substituting (22) and (23) into (21), and noting from substituting (18) and (19) into (21) that ( ) = 0 at P = 0,
For s = +1 the …rst term on the R.H.S. is zero, and so dR 1 =dP j P =0 > 0:
Proof of Proposition 4
We get
Consequently,
:
Substituting (18) and (19) into (a) and (c), we get
When P = 0, e = s and F (e) = F (s) = 1, so that (c) = 0; thus
We can change the order of integration so
So (27) holds if and only if Z s
We can express 1=(s(k 1)) as 
Consider the two terms inside the square brackets in (29),
and moreover at t = s;
Also y = (1 F (t)) k crosses the y and t axes at points (t = s; y = 1) and (t = s; y = 0) respectively and the linear function y = (1 t s ) crosses the y and t axes at points (t = s; y = 1 s s ) and (t = s; y = 0) respectively. Consider increasing k: the function y = (1 t s ) is unchanged but from (30) (1 F (t)) k is decreasing in k on (s; s) and converges to 0 as k ! 1, with the two points (t = s; y = 1) and (t = s; y = 0) staying …xed. Thus for any " > 0 and t > s; there exists a k 1 such that for k > k 1 ,
(1 F (t)) k < " and (using (31)) (1 F (t)) k < (1 t s ) on [t ; s). Consequently [(1 t s ) (1 F (t)) k ] < 0 on an arbitrarily small set close to s.
Next consider 1 t F (t) k 2 f (t). Since F (t) increases from 0 to 1 when t increases from s to s, when k gets larger, 1 t F (t) k 2 f (t) will assign a relatively larger/smaller weight to [(1 t s ) (1 F (t)) k ] for a large/small t. It is then straightforward to show that by letting " ! 0 and t ! s, the last two facts together imply that there must exist a k 2 such that (29) holds for all k > k 2 . This completes the proof.
Proof of Case 2
Substituting F (t) = t s s s and f (t) = 1 s s into (11), we have: We claim that for all k 3, (34) holds if
This is true because then the LHS of (35) becomes
We can see that the sign of (1 v) k 2 j(v) is determined by j(v) as 0 v 1.
Graphically, the value of (36) is equal to the area between the v axis and the curve As k increases in (36), more relative weight is put on j(v) for lower values of v, and as j(v) crosses the axis only once (when v = p 1 (s=s)), a positive integral cannot become negative. Therefore, we conclude that if R 1 0 (1 v) k 2 j(v)dvj k=3 > 0, then for all k 3; R 1 0 (1 v) k 2 j(v)dv > 0. We have:
= (1=12)[(s=s) 1] 5 f 3 + 28(s=s) 30(s=s) 2 6(s=s) 3 + 17(s=s) 4 6(s=s) 5 + 36(s=s) 2 ln(s=s) 36(s=s) 3 ln(s=s) + 12(s=s) 4 ln(s=s)g:
By analyzing the above equation, it is easy to check that when 0 < (s=s) 0:68, i.e., when (s=s) 1:47, R 1 0 (1 v) k 2 j(v)dvj k=3 > 0. Thus, the optimal punishment is strictly positive for all k 3.
Proof of Proposition 5
As now the cost function is c (x) instead of cx, player i 0 s maximization problem becomes:
M ax Then the FOC can be written as 0 (x) = 1 y (k 1)f (y)y 0 fV [1 F (y)] k 2 + P [F (y)) + 1 F (e)] k 2 g:
Using boundary condition y(e) = 0 and integration, we can derive that (x) = G(y)
where G(y) is de…ned exactly by (17) . Thus, x = 1 (G(y)), then B = x = g(G(y)) = g(b(c)). The equilibrium e¤ort function (12) is strictly decreasing since for all c 2 [s; e), it can be shown that dg dc = g 0 b 0 < 0. For the su¢ cient second-order condition we proceed exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1.
